Economic Freedom, Part 2

Most of us have an intuitive or common-sense notion of the meaning of economic freedom.  A smattering of features or attributes includes free markets, private enterprise, voluntary exchange, capitalism, limited government, laissez-faire, free trade, low taxes, free movement of capital, and other dimensions of economic life.

But we want to go beyond these descriptors to measures of economic freedom.  How much more economic freedom does South Korea have compared with North Korea?  Hong Kong with China?  China 35 years ago with China today?  Has economic freedom increased or decreased in Sweden during the last 10 years?  It would be ideal to develop a rating system that permits quantitative comparisons across nations and over time.

A first step is to develop a philosophy or definition of economic freedom in order to identify common (as well as divergent) elements that should be measured.

Political philosophers and thinkers have explored the notion of freedom from the beginning of recorded history.  The first use of the word “liberty” is traceable to ancient Sumer.  Cuneiform writing on clay cones excavated at Lagash, in Sumer, contained the freedom laws of the good King Urukagina that he promulgated to rid the land of tax collectors.

Ancient and medieval philosophers were largely concerned with the political dimensions of freedom:  a voice in collective decision making (Greek democracies).  Political freedom meant self-rule, or the absence of external control.  It did not emphasize the rights of the individual to non-interference from the state or protection under the rule of law.

The modern notion of freedom signifies non-interference in the private affairs of individuals in a society governed under the rule of law.  The freedom to own a certain amount of property was seen as a necessary condition for being able to maintain personal independence.  The development of property rights went hand-in-hand with longstanding provisions of human rights that were proclaimed in the Magna Carta in 1215, in thousands of medieval charters in England and continental Europe, and in the procedural safeguards of person and property that developed in the common law.

Against this backdrop, economic freedom seriously developed into a coherent and powerful intellectual tradition with the publication of John Locke’s Second Treatise of Civil Government (1689). which emphasized freedom of association, private property, and the sacrosanct nature of individual liberty secured under the rule of law.  David Hume reinforced Locke’s emphasis on the right to property as the foundation of society and government.

Locke was followed nearly a century later by Adam Smith with the publication of Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776), which emphasized a system of individual and commercial liberty based on private property.  Nineteenth-century England was governed by the principles of Locke and Smith.  Its hallmarks were free trade, laissez-faire, low taxes, low state expenditure, and a minimally interventionist government.

Milton Friedman was a modern-day Locke,  He asserted the primacy of the individual as the ultimate entity in society, focusing on the role that private property plays in fostering economic and political freedom, and economic prosperity.  Friedman, with the assistance of his wife Rose, set forth  a coherent statement of economic freedom in 1962 in a collection of essays entitled Capitalism and Freedom.  The book explains the role of competitive capitalism as a system of economic freedom.  It also discusses the legitimate role of government in a free society, identifying those areas where government intervention in the private affairs of individuals is warranted, but also where it goes beyond the limited legitimate tasks of government harming both economic freedom and efficiency.

The legitimate tasks of government include the maintenance of law and order to prevent physical coercion of one individual over another, to enforce contracts voluntarily entered into, and to regulate activities where one individual’s economic activity imposes harm or losses on another (externalities).

In a later volume Free to Choose (1980), the Friedmans set forth an Economic Bill of Rights, a counterpart to the political Bill of Rights in the Constitution.  These include a tax or spending limitation as a share of national income, freedom to import and export (free trade), a ban on wage and price controls, a ban on occupational licensure, a requirement for proportional taxation (flat-rate tax), and others.

A third approach to economic freedom is embodied in the libertarian work of Murray Rothbard, the purest expression of economic freedom.  Rothbard grounded his political philosophy of liberty on a natural law foundation, especially Locke’s treatment of property and ownership.  His theory of liberty rests on the establishment of the rights of property, which determines each individual’s sphere of free action.  His society of pure freedom is based on free and voluntary exchanges.  The free market economy thus depends on upon a free society with a certain pattern of property rights and ownership titles.  He departs from Friedman on the need for the state to enforce contracts.  It is not the function of law to enforce morality or promises made to each other.  Enforcement is only appropriate when one party steals the property of another.

Going further, Rothbard defines taxation as theft.  The use of coercive taxation to acquire revenue and the compulsory monopoly of force and ultimate decision-making power over a given territorial area on the part of the state constitute criminal aggression and depredation of the just rights of private property of its subjects.  Rothbard also contends that the services generally thought to require a state, from the coining of public money to police protection to the development of law in the defense of private property rights (all part of Friedman’s legitimate role for government) can be and have been supplied with greater efficiency and morality by private persons.

Rothbard’s libertarian vision is more utopian than practical.  Other philosophers, from John Locke to Adam Smith to Milton Friedman, grant specific, if limited, powers to government or the state, including the power to tax, enforce laws, maintain order, and defend the nation, which reflects the real world activities of government.

A fuller discussion of this synopsis of the philosophical aspects or definition of economic freedom is found in the Books section of my website, alvinrabushka.com, in Chapter 2, pp.23-55, of Economic Freedom:  Toward a Theory of Measurement.  See my article “Philosophical Aspects of Economic Freedom” and accompanying discussion, which can be downloaded here.  I encourage you to read the chapter.

The next post sets forth possible measures with which to rate economic freedom.

Economic Freedom, Part 1

In October 1986, with support from the Liberty Fund in Indianapolis, Indiana, the Fraser Institute convened the first of four conferences in Napa Valley, California.  The Fraser Institute published the proceedings in 1988, Economic Freedom, Democracy and Welfare.  Edited by Michael A. Walker, Director of The Fraser Institute, and co-chaired with Milton and Rose Friedman, the conference was organized as a counterpart to do for economic freedom what Freedom House did for political freedom:  to calculate the amount of economic freedom that exists in various nations of the world.

Its origins can be traced to a conversation in 1994 at the Mont Pelerin Meeting in Cambridge, England, between Michael Walker and Milton Friedman, whose book Capitalism and Freedom had been extant since 1962.  However, there had been no serious attempt to explore the relationship between economic and political freedom in a scholarly way.  That conversation led to the idea of broadening the analysis to also include civil freedoms, which can often be more important than political freedoms.

The conference consisted of several conceptual, historical, and statistical papers, most notably those Nobel Laureates in Economics Douglass C. North and Milton Friedman.  These were fleshed out with case studies on economic freedom in East Asia (Alvin Rabushka), Africa (Lord Peter Bauer), Latin America (Ramon Diaz), and Sweden (Ingemar Stahl).  Another paper dealt with property rights (Svetozar Pejovich).  Discussants included Armen Alchian, Walter Block, Herbert J. Grubel, Arnold Harberger, Brian Kantor, Assar Lindbeck, Michael Parkin, Gordon Tullock, and Sir Alan Walters.  It would be hard to find a more distinguished group of scholars concerned with economic freedom, or any other economic subject for that matter.

A second conference was convened in July 1988 in Vancouver, Canada.  Edited by Walter E. Block, the proceedings were published in 1991, Economic Freedom:  Toward a Theory of Measurement.  (The volume is available for free download on my website alvinrabushka.com.)  This conference was designed to set forth the philosophical foundations of economic freedom and its conceptual definition that would provide a basis for measurement.

Michael Walker set the background for the proceedings with a summary of the preceding conference held in Napa Valley.  Alvin Rabushka wrote the next three papers:  “Philosophical Aspects of Economic Freedom,” “Freedom House Survey of Economic Freedoms“ (for comparative purposes), and “Preliminary Definition of Economic Freedom.”  I will discuss the contents of these papers in subsequent posts.  The final paper was an initial attempt by Zane Spindler and Laurie Still to calculate “Economic Freedom Rankings” for 145 countries on a five-point scale based on Rabushka’s “Definition” paper.

Conference participants, in alphabetical order, also included James Ahiakpor, David Friedman, Milton Friedman, Rose Friedman, James Gwartney, William Hammett, Henri LePage, Henry Manne, Richard McKenzie, Antonio Martino, Charles Murray, Ellen Paul, Robert Poole, and Gerard Radnitsky.

The third and fourth conferences were held in Banff, Alberta, Canada in 1989, and Sea Ranch, California in 1990.  The two were melded into the third volume in The Fraser Institute Rating Economic Freedom Project.  Stephen T. Easton and Michael A. Walker edited the volume, Rating Global Economic Freedom, published in 1992.

Papers in this volume focused on more precise measures of economic freedom for countries around the world for which data were available.

Authors and participants included James C.W. Ahiakpor, Juan F. Bendfelt, Walter E. Block, Jack L. Carr, John F. Chant, Edward H. Crane, Arthur T. Denzau, Thomas J. DiLorenzo, Stephen T. Easton, Milton Friedman, John C. Goodman, James D. Gwartney, Edward Lee Hudgins, Ronald W. Jones, Robert A. Lawson, Richard McKenzie, Joanna F. Miyake, Charles Murray, Alvin Rabushka, Richard W. Rahn, Alan Reynolds, Laurie Rubner, Gerard W. Scully, Bernard H. Siegan, Zane A. Spindler, Alan C. Stockman, Richard L. Stroup, Melanie Tammen, and Michael A. Walker.

The first comprehensive report based on the four conferences and three conference volumes was Walter Block, James Gwartney, and Robert A. Lawson, Economic Freedom of the World, 1975-1995, published on January 1, 1996.  Thereafter subsequent annual reports were published for 1997, 1998-1999, and then annually through 2018 (published in conjunction with the Cato Institute since 2001).  Separate periodic reports for North America were published from 2002 and for the Arab World from 2005.  Altogether, about a dozen individuals have helped to edit the series of annual reports on Economic Freedom.

In 1995, The Heritage Foundation, in conjunction with the Wall Street Journal, created a rival Index of Economic Freedom.  The Heritage/WSJ index was conceptually and empirically simpler than the Fraser Index.

Subsequent posts in this series will discuss in greater detail the philosophy, concepts, and measures of Economic Freedom that make up the Fraser Institute Annual Report. 

U.S. Foreign Policy Faces Grave Danger, Part 5

This post wraps up my series on U.S. Foreign Policy Faces Grave Danger.

In March 2005, Bush adviser Karen Hughes was named to a State Department post, Deputy Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy. In late September 2005 she traveled to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey to open a dialogue with important Muslim countries. Her task was to persuade them that Bush’s War on Terror was not a War against Islam.

On September 26, 2005, Hughes met with a small group of Egyptians who had studied in the U.S. She told them “it’s sometimes hard to talk about difficult issues,” but that “we’re open to ideas.”

Prominent Egyptians told Hughes that the U.S. can improve its image in the Middle East only by changing its policies, namely, that its policies on Iraq, Iran, Syria, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and what the U.S. said was inconsistent with its [favorable] treatment of repressive Arab governments.

Hughes second stop was Saudi Arabia, On September 27, 2018, she told a group of Saudi women that they could be like her and have the right to drive and wear pretty clothes.

The Saudi women harshly criticized her for denouncing their culture and trying to force change on Saudi society. They told her that Saudi women were happy and did not like the image of unhappy Saudi women portrayed in the American media. These remarks met with applause from female colleagues dressed in the black abaya.

Next stop was Turkey. In a September 28, 2005, meeting with Turkish women active in non-governmental organizations, Hughes was harshly criticized due to Bush’s decision to invade Iraq.

Hughes trip was a total failure. But the fault was that of Bush and his foreign policy team, not Hughes. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Egypt to talk about human rights. After a speech at the American University of Cairo on June 20, 2005, she got an earful from Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.

In October 2007, Karen Hughes resigned her position and returned to private business.

Bush, Rice, and Hughes were steeped in the paradigm of Western democracy. It was inconceivable to them that Middle East residents were not equally keen on American political institutions, practices, and values. Bush’s vision of a just war in Iraq to promote democracy was in marked opposition to views held by the region’s major powers.

Diversity and Inclusion

Every U.S. college and university adheres to the doctrine that Diversity and Inclusion of students, faculty, and staff is essential for educated Americans to interact productively in their political, economic, and social relations with foreigners of different racial, religious, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, gender, tribal, social, economic, and other distinguishing characteristics. Diversity and Inclusion further stipulates that interaction between different groups must take place under respectful conditions in which the values, ideas, and contributions of each group are made to feel welcome and equally valued.

No prominent individual has been able to persuade university leaders and faculty that the doctrine of Diversity and Inclusion on which all of U.S. higher education is predicated could possibly be wrong in any way.

Much as Chinese higher education is governed by Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the Modern era, so too U.S. higher education is governed by Bush/ObamaThought on Democracy with American characteristics of Diversity and Inclusion for the Modern Era.

Let’s consider the counter-argument.

First, the story of Karen Hughes is self-explanatory.

Second, those instilled with (blinded by) D&I as the only acceptable view of human relations will be unable to acknowledge, much less deal with, reality when it differs from D&I.

Third, individuals who factually describe, let’s call them “fact-based realists (FBR),” poor or harmful conditions among peoples in different places around the world will be harshly criticized by Americans who descend from, or identify with, those persons. Americans of African, Latin American, Asian, and other backgrounds will accuse FBR of racism, sexism, homophobia, and so forth. FBR will be compelled to recant their “disrespectful” statements and/or resign their positions. In American parlance, FBR will be accused of “blaming the victims.”

Fourth, stating the fact that the vast majority of countries and active secessionist movements, some three-quarters of the world’s population, live in countries that prize Homogeneity and Exclusion will be deemed heresy, punishable by loss of job and social ostracism.

Fifth, in plural societies, rival groups do not respect and value each other. Rather, rival groups hate each other. Perhaps that explains Bush’s failure to understand that his vision of a unified Iraq is not shared by Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds. Or, English and French-speaking Cameroonians. And on and on and on for dozens of countries and secessionist movements.

Foreign policy cannot be constructively conducted in a world driven by U.S. based identity politics that precludes FBR. It must go wrong. Think George W. Bush and Iraq. Think Barack Obama and Libya and Syria.

Politics in Plural Societies

Only now, that leftist intellectuals have rediscovered identity politics in the wake of President Trump’s presumed White-backlash election victory over Hillary Clinton, has identity politics come to the fore. The democracy school encompassing over 90% of U.S. political scientists has been trying to show that democracy is an unstoppable force spreading around the world, transcending group differences.

But in the past few years, these same scholars write of a democracy recession, a democracy depression. I’ll limit my comments here to Francis Fukuyama’s 2018 book entitled Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment. In a summary article published on September 12, 2018, in The Hill, Fukuyama states that “The United States invaded Iraq in 2003, arguing that it intended to replace Saddam Hussein with a friendly democratic regime. Fifteen years later, that goal does not appear in sight.”

What went wrong?

“The underlying problem in Iraq is the absence of any sense of overarching national identity. There is no entity called Iraq to which citizens feel loyalty, in preference to their ethnic group, sect, region, or tribe.” (Did he not know that Sunnis and Shias have been enemies for twelve centuries?)

“Within the greater Middle East, Syria, Somalia and Afghanistan have been embroiled in civil wars as a result of out-of-control identity politics.”

Fukuyama notes that the Democrat Party has changed from broad-based coalitions of the New Deal and Great Society to one based on its component identity groups. He blames that partly on Democrats who rejected assimilation to an overarching national identity and partly on Donald Trump and the rise of a new generation of right-wing identitarians. 

I’m not going to comment on the pros and cons of his recommendations for national service to cut across race, ethnicity, and class. You can buy his book, read them, and decide for yourself. What is important about his book, and a spate of others echoing the same theme, is that identity politics obstructs democracy. This is how they explain the democracy recession/depression and the rise of “nationalists” states around the world.

What is amazing has been their denial of FBR for decades, in which identities have been held in check by colonial powers and authoritarian regimes. FBR was not compatible with their global democracy activism.

Herein lies great danger. Diversity and Inclusion is an ideology. Ideology, as the late Professor William Riker stated, is a false view of reality. There can be no room for fact-based realists in the D&I utopian remake of American society. Conducting FBR foreign policy is going to be a nightmare for future presidents, secretaries of state, and secretaries of defense.

Two Wrongs Make A Right

First.  In my post of September 23, 2018, I criticized Senator Chuck Grassley’s handling of Judge Brett Kavanaugh’s nomination for associate justice of the Supreme Court in the Senate Judiciary Committee.  I was premature and wrong.  Senator Grassley brilliantly shepherded Judge Kavanaugh’s nomination through the Judiciary Committee.

Second.  In my post of September 11, 2018, I wrote that Stanford was poised to win the football national championship, earning Coach David Shaw a ring.  I was premature and wrong.  Notre Dame and Utah obliterated Stanford’s defense and Shaw’s offense could not mount a successful running game.

To be fair to myself, I wrote that Coach Shaw had to make a modest change or two in his offensive scheme, beginning with a play action pass on first down from its power run formation.  Shaw did not.  After two failed runs into the teeth of the Notre Dame and Utah defensive fronts, Quarterback K.J. Costello had to run for his life trying to complete third-and-long passes against relentless defensive pressure.  Costello did a creditable job in both games, save one underthrown pass against Utah, keeping Stanford in contention for as long as he could, but to no avail.

After the game, Coach Shaw doubled down on his offensive scheme, reminding reporters that he has been successful during his tenure and that power football is Stanford’s philosophy.  During the break between the first and second quarters of the game, one of the ESPN broadcasters said that “Shaw is stubborn.”  Stanford can still make it to the Rose Bowl this season, but the prospects are not encouraging.  Watch for the opening offensive series in the next game, which will tell you all you need to know.

PS.  Still, every day brings a beautiful morning.  Hillary is not in the White House and that her friends are not holding high government office.  With Kavanaugh’s confirmation, the sun is brighter than ever.  The 80-90% left-leaning, Democrat Party faculty and administrators of the top 20 national universities wake up miserable every day, and will remain so through at least 2020, possibly (and hopefully) 2024.

Oh what a beautiful morning

Oh what a beautiful day

I’ve got a wonderful feeling

Everything’s going America’s way.

Keep winning Mr. President!

U.S Foreign Policy Faces Grave Danger, Part 4

Separatist movements are active movements with living, active members that seek greater autonomy or self-determination for a geographic region.  Some movements have de facto autonomy, which makes them a de facto (breakaway) state.  Some are proposed states that have a name for a seceding sovereign state.  Some are proposing autonomous areas that seek greater autonomy, but not outright secession.  Some movements are driven (largely) by ethnic identity, others by political ideologies or pressure groups.

This posts enumerates ethnic identity secessionist movements, listing country, ethnic group(s) seeking statehood, and name of proposed state.  (Wikipedia)

Africa (23)

Algeria.  Kabyle people.  Republic of Kabylia

Angola

     Lunda-Tchokwe People.  Democratic Republic of Lunda-Tchokwe.

     Cabindans,  Republic of Cabinda.

Cameroon.  The Anglophones of the NW and SW regions of Cameroon.

     The Federal Republic of Ambazonia.

Central African Republic.  Muslims in CAR.  Republic of Logone.

Equatorial Guinea.  Bubi.  Bioko Island.

Libya.  Toubu.  Tubouland.

Mali.  Tuareg, Songhai, Fula, and Arabs/Moors.  Azawad.

Morocco. 

     Sahrawi.  Sahrawi Aran Democratic Republic.

     Riffian.  Rif.

Namibia.  Lozi.  Free State of Caprivi Strip/Itenge.

Niger.  Tuareg.  Agadez.

Rwanda.  Twa.  Batwaland.

Senegal.  Diola.  Casamance.

Somalia.  Somali.  Somilaland.

South Africa.  Afrikaners.  Volkstaat.

Spain.  Canarians.  Canary Islands.

Sudan.  Fur, Zghawe, Masalit.  Darfur.

Tanzania.  Swahili.  Zanzibar.

Uganda.

     Ganda.  Kingdom of Buganda.

     Konjo People.  Yiira Republic.

Zambia.  Lozi.  Barotseland.

Zimbabwe.  Matabele.  Matabeleland.

Asia (49)

Burma (Myanmar).

     Arakan.  Arakan Federation.

     Chin.  Republic of Zo Asia.

     Kachin.  Kachinland.

     Karen.  Republic of Kawthoolei.

     Karenni.  United Karenni Independent States.

     Mon.  Mon State.

     Rohingya.  Northern Arakan State of Arakan Federation.

     Shan.  Federated Shan States.

     Wa.  Wa State.

     Kuki.  Zale’n-gam

     Zomi.  Republic of Zogam

China.

     Mongolian.  Republic of South Mongolia.

     Tibetan.  Tibet.

     Uyghur.  East Turkestan.

India.

     Kashmiri Muslims.  Kashmir.

     Naga People.  People’s Republic of Nagaland.

     Tripuri People.  Tripuri.

     Meitei People.  Manipur.

     Assamese People.  Assam.

     Bodo People.  Bodoland.

     Kamatapuri lects.  Kamtur.

Iran.

     Azerbaijani.  South Azerbaijan.

     Turkmen.  South Turkmenistan.

     Arabs.  Al-Ahwaz.

     Kurdish.  Kurdistan.

     Baloch  Balochistan.

Iraq.

     Kurdish.  Kurdistan.

     Turkmen.  Turkmeneli.

Japan.

     Ainu.  Republic of Ainu.

     Ryukyuan.  Republic of Ryukyu.

Laos.  Hmong.  Hmong ChaoFa Federated States.

Nepal.  Madhesi Peoples.  Madhesh.

Pakistan.

     Baloch.  Balochistan.

     Sindhi.  Sindhudesh.

     Balti People.  Balawaristan.

Philippines.  Moro.  Bangsomoro Republik.

Russia.

     Yakuts.  Sakha Republic.

     Tuvans.  Tuva.

Sri Lanka.  Tamils.  Tamil Eelam.

Syria.

     Druze.  Jabal Druze State.

     Arameans.  Aram.

     Assyrian.  Assyria.

     Syrian Turkmen.  Babirbucak and Northern Aleppo.

Tajikistan.  Pamiri.  United Badakhshan Peoples Republic.

Thailand.  Malays.  Greater Patani State.

Turkwy.  Kurdish.  Kurdistan.

Uzbekistan.  Karakapaks.  Republic of Karakalpakstan.

Yemen.

     Adeni Arabs.  South Arabia (State of Aden)

     Hadhrami Arabs.  Kathiri, Qu’aiti, Wahidi Balhaf, Mahra.

Europe (50)

Belgium

    Flemish Dutch.  Flanders

     Walloons.  Walloon Republic.

Denmark.  Faroese.  Faroe Islands.

Finland.  Aland swedes.  Aland.

France.

     Basque People.  Unification with Basque Country.

     Bretons.  Brittany.

     Corsicans.  Corsica.

     Savoyans.  Savoy.

     Occitans People.  Occitania.

     Provencals.  Provence.

     Alsatians.  Alsace.

     Normans.  Normandy.

Germany.  Bavarians.  Free State of Bavaria.

Italy.

     Friulans.  Friuli.

     Ligures.  Republic of Genoa.

     Lombards.  Republic of Lombardy.

     Southern Italians.  Ausonia.

     Northern Italians.  Padania.

     Sardinians.  Republic of Sardinia.

     Siciians,  Sicily.

     South Tyroleans.  Unification with Tyrol Austria.

     Venetians.  Republic of Venice.

Moldova.  Gagauz People.  Republic of Gagauzia.

Poland.  Silesians.  Silesia.

Russia.  Karelians.  Karelia.

Spain.

     Andalusian.  Andalusia.

     Aragonese.  Aragon.

     Asturians.  Asturias.

     Baleariacs-Catalanics (those with Catalan Ancestry).  Balearic Islands.

     Basques.  Basque Country.

     Canarians.  Republic of the Canary Islands.

     Cantabrians.  Cantabria.

     Castillians.  Castile.

     Catalans.  Catalan Republic.

     Galicians.  Galicia.

     Leonese.  Leonese Country.

     Navarran.  Unification with Basque Country.

     Valencians-Catalanics (those with Catalan Ancestry).  Kingdom of Valencia.

     Extremadurans.  Extremadura.

     Murcians.  Murcia.

Switzerland.

     Jurassien.  Free State of Jura.

     Ticinesi (Italian-speaking).  Unification with Lombardy.

United Kingdom.

     Cornish.  Cornwall.

     English.  England.

     Irish.  Reunification with Republic of Ireland.

     Ulster Scots.  Uster.

     Scots.  Scotland.

     Shetlanders.  Unification with Norway.

     Welsh.  Wales.

     Manx.  Isle of Man.

North America (6)

Denmark.  Greenlanders.  Greenland.

Nicaragua.  Miskito.  Communitarian Nation of Moskitia.

United States.

     Lakotah.  Republic of Lakota.

     Puerto Rican.  Puerto Rico.

French Overseas Departments.

     Martinican.  Republic of Martinique.

     Guadeloupean.  Guadeloupe.

(Note.  Provincial independence movements in Canada and State independence movements in the U.S. are largely territorial, not ethnic or racial.)

Oceania (8)

Australia

     Torres Strait Islanders.  Torres Strait Islands.

     Norfolk Islanders.  Norfolk Isand.

Chile.  Rapa Nui.  Rape Nui.

Fiji.  Rotuman.  Rotuma.

French Overseas Departments.

     New Caledonia.  Kanaks.  Kanaky.

New Zealand.

     Ariki.  Sovereign Kingdom of the Cook Islands.

     Maori.  Republic of New Zealand.

United States.

     Hawaiians.  Create native Hawaiian nations equal to Native American nations.

South America (4)

Argentina.  Mapuche People.  Es:Wallmapu.

Bolivia.  Aymara.  Collasyu.

Chile.  Mapuche People.  Es:Wallmapu.

Columbia.  Raizal People.  San Andres y Providencia.

Africa (23)

Algeria.  Kabyle people.  Republic of Kabylia

Angola

     Lunda-Tchokwe People.  Democratic Republic of Lunda-Tchokwe.

     Cabindans,  Republic of Cabinda.

Cameroon.  The Anglophones of the NW and SW regions of Cameroon.

     The Federal Republic of Ambazonia.

Central African Republic.  Muslims in CAR.  Republic of Logone.

Equatorial Guinea.  Bubi.  Bioko Island.

Libya.  Toubu.  Tubouland.

Mali.  Tuareg, Songhai, Fula, and Arabs/Moors.  Azawad.

Morocco. 

     Sahrawi.  Sahrawi Aran Democratic Republic.

     Riffian.  Rif.

Namibia.  Lozi.  Free State of Caprivi Strip/Itenge.

Niger.  Tuareg.  Agadez.

Rwanda.  Twa.  Batwaland.

Senegal.  Diola.  Casamance.

Somalia.  Somali.  Somilaland.

South Africa.  Afrikaners.  Volkstaat.

Spain.  Canarians.  Canary Islands.

Sudan.  Fur, Zghawe, Masalit.  Darfur.

Tanzania.  Swahili.  Zanzibar.

Uganda.

     Ganda.  Kingdom of Buganda.

     Konjo People.  Yiira Republic.

Zambia.  Lozi.  Barotseland.

Zimbabwe.  Matabele.  Matabeleland.

Asia (49)

Burma (Myanmar).

     Arakan.  Arakan Federation.

     Chin.  Republic of Zo Asia.

     Kachin.  Kachinland.

     Karen.  Republic of Kawthoolei.

     Karenni.  United Karenni Independent States.

     Mon.  Mon State.

     Rohingya.  Northern Arakan State of Arakan Federation.

     Shan.  Federated Shan States.

     Wa.  Wa State.

     Kuki.  Zale’n-gam

     Zomi.  Republic of Zogam

China.

     Mongolian.  Republic of South Mongolia.

     Tibetan.  Tibet.

     Uyghur.  East Turkestan.

India.

     Kashmiri Muslims.  Kashmir.

     Naga People.  People’s Republic of Nagaland.

     Tripuri People.  Tripuri.

     Meitei People.  Manipur.

     Assamese People.  Assam.

     Bodo People.  Bodoland.

     Kamatapuri lects.  Kamtur.

Iran.

     Azerbaijani.  South Azerbaijan.

     Turkmen.  South Turkmenistan.

     Arabs.  Al-Ahwaz.

     Kurdish.  Kurdistan.

     Baloch  Balochistan.

Iraq.

     Kurdish.  Kurdistan.

     Turkmen.  Turkmeneli.

Japan.

     Ainu.  Republic of Ainu.

     Ryukyuan.  Republic of Ryukyu.

Laos.  Hmong.  Hmong ChaoFa Federated States.

Nepal.  Madhesi Peoples.  Madhesh.

Pakistan.

     Baloch.  Balochistan.

     Sindhi.  Sindhudesh.

     Balti People.  Balawaristan.

Philippines.  Moro.  Bangsomoro Republik.

Russia.

     Yakuts.  Sakha Republic.

     Tuvans.  Tuva.

Sri Lanka.  Tamils.  Tamil Eelam.

Syria.

     Druze.  Jabal Druze State.

     Arameans.  Aram.

     Assyrian.  Assyria.

     Syrian Turkmen.  Babirbucak and Northern Aleppo.

Tajikistan.  Pamiri.  United Badakhshan Peoples Republic.

Thailand.  Malays.  Greater Patani State.

Turkwy.  Kurdish.  Kurdistan.

Uzbekistan.  Karakapaks.  Republic of Karakalpakstan.

Yemen.

     Adeni Arabs.  South Arabia (State of Aden)

     Hadhrami Arabs.  Kathiri, Qu’aiti, Wahidi Balhaf, Mahra.

Europe (50)

Belgium

    Flemish Dutch.  Flanders

     Walloons.  Walloon Republic.

Denmark.  Faroese.  Faroe Islands.

Finland.  Aland swedes.  Aland.

France.

     Basque People.  Unification with Basque Country.

     Bretons.  Brittany.

     Corsicans.  Corsica.

     Savoyans.  Savoy.

     Occitans People.  Occitania.

     Provencals.  Provence.

     Alsatians.  Alsace.

     Normans.  Normandy.

Germany.  Bavarians.  Free State of Bavaria.

Italy.

     Friulans.  Friuli.

     Ligures.  Republic of Genoa.

     Lombards.  Republic of Lombardy.

     Southern Italians.  Ausonia.

     Northern Italians.  Padania.

     Sardinians.  Republic of Sardinia.

     Siciians,  Sicily.

     South Tyroleans.  Unification with Tyrol Austria.

     Venetians.  Republic of Venice.

Moldova.  Gagauz People.  Republic of Gagauzia.

Poland.  Silesians.  Silesia.

Russia.  Karelians.  Karelia.

Spain.

     Andalusian.  Andalusia.

     Aragonese.  Aragon.

     Asturians.  Asturias.

     Baleariacs-Catalanics (those with Catalan Ancestry).  Balearic Islands.

     Basques.  Basque Country.

     Canarians.  Republic of the Canary Islands.

     Cantabrians.  Cantabria.

     Castillians.  Castile.

     Catalans.  Catalan Republic.

     Galicians.  Galicia.

     Leonese.  Leonese Country.

     Navarran.  Unification with Basque Country.

     Valencians-Catalanics (those with Catalan Ancestry).  Kingdom of Valencia.

     Extremadurans.  Extremadura.

     Murcians.  Murcia.

Switzerland.

     Jurassien.  Free State of Jura.

     Ticinesi (Italian-speaking).  Unification with Lombardy.

United Kingdom.

     Cornish.  Cornwall.

     English.  England.

     Irish.  Reunification with Republic of Ireland.

     Ulster Scots.  Uster.

     Scots.  Scotland.

     Shetlanders.  Unification with Norway.

     Welsh.  Wales.

     Manx.  Isle of Man.

North America (6)

Denmark.  Greenlanders.  Greenland.

Nicaragua.  Miskito.  Communitarian Nation of Moskitia.

United States.

     Lakotah.  Republic of Lakota.

     Puerto Rican.  Puerto Rico.

French Overseas Departments.

     Martinican.  Republic of Martinique.

     Guadeloupean.  Guadeloupe.

(Note.  Provincial independence movements in Canada and State independence movements in the U.S. are largely territorial, not ethnic or racial.)

Oceania (8)

Australia

     Torres Strait Islanders.  Torres Strait Islands.

     Norfolk Islanders.  Norfolk Isand.

Chile.  Rapa Nui.  Rape Nui.

Fiji.  Rotuman.  Rotuma.

French Overseas Departments.

     New Caledonia.  Kanaks.  Kanaky.

New Zealand.

     Ariki.  Sovereign Kingdom of the Cook Islands.

     Maori.  Republic of New Zealand.

United States.

     Hawaiians.  Create native Hawaiian nations equal to Native American nations.

South America (4)

Argentina.  Mapuche People.  Es:Wallmapu.

Bolivia.  Aymara.  Collasyu.

Chile.  Mapuche People.  Es:Wallmapu.

Columbia.  Raizal People.  San Andres y Providencia.

This list of 150 active secessionist movements seeking sovereign statehood excludes a small number of breakaway regions that are de facto sovereign states.  It also excludes well over another hundred plus active movements seeking greater autonomy within a sovereign state.  Any of the latter has the potential to intensify into a secessionist movement.

Summary

The number of sovereign, largely Homogeneous and Exclusive (H&E), states amounts to 196.  To this should be added 150 active H&E movements seeking statehood. Including breakaway de facto states puts the total number past 360.  Diversity and Inclusion in the United States is the outlier in the character of sovereign statehood.

As previously stated, demographic change has transformed the U.S. from an overwhelmingly White population to a plural society, in which no ethnic or racial group will be a majority by 2045.  Hyphenated-Americans of different backgrounds will have to live together in a single sovereign state for the foreseeable future.

The great challenge will be if Americans, whose life experiences are dominated by Diversity and Inclusion, will be able to successfully interact with the residents in hundreds of Homogenous and Exclusive countries and regions, whose collective lives are defined by borders, language and culture.

One can envisage a future in which Americans will have the concept of Homogeneous and Exclusive deemed heretical and drummed out of their consciousness.  How will they be able to understand and interact with H&E countries?

Academic Freedom Hangs By A Thread

In a previous post comparing Chinese and American universities, I noted that applicants for a faculty position at the University of California must submit a Diversity Statement.

This is no minor detail.  In the section on Academic Diversity Statements under Academic Personnel for UC Santa Cruz, the last sentence unequivocally states that “Applications that do not include a Diversity Statement will not be forwarded to the search committee for consideration.”

What should be included in a Diversity Statement?  “Describe any experience or background that has made you aware of challenges faced by historically underrepresented populations.”  These include mentoring activities, committee service, research activities, teaching activities, and other activities that show how you have advanced Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion among underrepresented groups.  In addition, applicants must describe the role they envision in contributing to Diversity in the next two to five years.  Applicants are also encouraged to discuss their philosophy of Diversity as a potential UC Santa Cruz faculty member.

Similar guidelines are posted on the web sites of UCBerkeley, UC San Francisco, UCLA (page 5), and other campuses in the UC system.

Applications will not be accepted for consideration without a loyalty oath to Diversity.  Diversity and Inclusion do not permit questioning or criticizing Diversity and Inclusion as official doctrine of the UC system set forth by the Office of the President overseeing all nine UC campuses and the Chancellor of each campus.  Of course, prospective professors can avoid taking an oath to Diversity.  Do not apply for a faculty appointment in the UC system. 

UC campuses are ranked numbers 1, 2, 5, 7, 10, 12, 26, and 35 among the top 50 public universities in the United States.  It’s only a matter of time until Diversity Statements are required for faculty positions for the 23 campuses of the California State University System, all California Junior Colleges, and most universities and colleges throughout the United States.  Can Academic Freedom survive if the oath is required in the colleges and universities in most or all of the 50 states and federal territories with colleges and universities?

In Defense of Academic Freedom

In the past few years, several university presidents have issued statements in support of Academic Freedom.  Perhaps the strongest is that of President Robert J. Zimmer of the University of Chicago on October 20, 2017.  It is a must read for every university president, provost, and dean.  Several other leading universities have followed suit.

Closer to home, on November 7, 2017, and February 21, 2018, Stanford’s president and provost posted articles on the Stanford's concomitant commitment to the free exchange of ideas and an inclusive campus culture.  Provost Drell acknowledged that it is extremely difficult to balance the principles of free expression with ideals of an inclusive community.  It is even harder to implement in practice.  When does Diversity and Inclusion curtail or give way to Academic Freedom?

In a statement released on July 20, 2018, Thomas Gilligan, director of the Hoover Institution, announced the Institution’s support of professor Mike McFaul, who the Russian government was seeking to interview.  Gilligan said, “The free expression of ideas is absolutely central to the academic life of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.  We stand behind professor Mike McFaul’s freedom of inquiry, thought, expression, speech, and publication—ideals that are fundamental to the mission of the university and to the Hoover Institution,  An assault on Mike McFaul’s academic freedom for the purpose of retribution and intimidation cannot and should not be tolerated.” 

A history conference held at Hoover during the 2017-18 academic year was criticized by the provost because it failed to include any female historian paper givers.  The provost stated that she did not want to see any more Hoover conferences with all male presenters.  The Academic Freedom of Hoover fellows to organize conferences as they deem intellectually appropriate was not defended as an exercise of Academic Freedom as it was for McFaul.

In practice, Inclusion trumps Academic Freedom.  It is likely to do so in the overwhelming majority of cases when the two principles conflict.

In marked contrast, conferences consisting of all Black, all Hispanic, or all female paper givers generally proceed without objection.  Over the past 8 years, I attended four events at Stanford’s Clayman Center for Gender Research.  None included a male of any racial or ethnic background.  No problem.

Time will tell if Academic Freedom can coexist with Diversity and Inclusion.  The spread of a required Diversity Statement has already eroded Academic Freedom in California.  Can Chicago hold firm or will it be “Apres Chicago, la deluge.”

It’s only a hop, skip, and a jump to extend the doctrine of Diversity and Inclusion to encompass Inequality Reduction.  Some campuses already use the broader phrase of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion.  Applicants for a faculty appointment at the University of California and other schools could soon be required to complete an Inequality Statement, reporting what they have done to reduce Inequality, and how their research and teaching in the next two to five years will reduce it.

The best artistic representation of the Diversity and Inclusion requirement at the University of California is French painter Jacque Louis David's Oath of the Horatii.